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Europe and the Atlantic community have arrived at a historic turning point. 
With the wrenching ideological and geopolitical cleavages of the Cold War 
behind them, the Western democracies are seeking to consolidate their gains 
and extend peace, democracy, and free markets across Europe. To do so, the 
European Union is preparing for enlargement at the same time that it introduces 
a new level of supranationality through a single currency and a stronger defence 
identity. And NATO is embarking on its own plans for enlargement, getting 
ready to embrace in successive waves Europe's new democracies. At least on 
the surface, the West is triumphantly charting a course for the next century.
Beneath the surface, however, a profound disquiet accompanies on-going 
efforts to transform the institutions of the West. Preparation for monetary union 
is proceeding, but amidst widespread doubts about its economic desirability and 
political viability. NATO enlargement is on track, but also amidst deep 
reservations on both sides of the Atlantic about its purpose and consequences. 
Anxious self-doubt rather than triumphalism increasingly characterises debate 
about the future of the West.
This sense of unease is all too appropriate. Despite their good intentions, 
the leaders of the established democracies have embarked on a course that will 
lead to the demise of the West, not its renewal. At the core of the problem is 
that they are trying to broaden the community of peaceful, democratic nations 
even as they deepen it. But if enlargement is to be both politically feasible and 
strategically desirable, they must first loosen the West's structures.
Absent the Soviet threat, the vision of Europe embodied in the Maastricht 
Treaty is now but a legacy of a former era. Preparations for monetary union 
notwithstanding, efforts to move toward centralised governance of Europe and a 
common foreign and security policy are foundering as national states dig in and 
resist further attempts to whittle away their sovereignty.1 Worse still, the futile 
push toward federalism is absorbing the energy and resources that should be 
devoted to the EU's most important and urgent mission: its enlargement to the 
east."
NATO, on the other hand, is addressing the task of enlargement with the 
urgency it deserves. But NATO has been misdirecting its energies into a heated 
debate over which Central European countries to admit and when to do so, 
failing to recognise that the problem is in the very nature of the alliance, not its 
membership. Formal military blocs and the rigor of territorial guarantees are no 
longer necessary or politically sustainable. Rather than asking ‘who gets in 



























































































Unless the EU and NATO undertake fundamental reform, they risk 
coming apart just as they draw within reach of completing their historic mission 
to unite a peaceful and democratic Europe. The excessive ambition of current 
policies will overextend Western institutions, undermining the transatlantic 
community as Member States defect from unwanted commitments. Instead, 
Western leaders must scale back their vision and seek to strike a balance 
between institutions that demand too much and those that deliver too little. 
They must devise a framework that occupies a new and vital centre and that 
promises to match commitments and responsibilities to political realities.
The solution to the West’s dilemmas is an Atlantic Union (AU) that 
would subsume the EU and NATO. The EU would abandon its federal 
aspirations and concentrate instead on the extension of its single market East to 
Central Europe and West to North America. NATO would become the defence 
arm of the AU, but its binding commitments to the collective defence of state 
borders would give way to more relaxed commitments to uphold collective 
security through peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and preventive diplomacy. 
The AU could then open its doors to the new democracies of Central Europe in 
a manner acceptable to both Russia and commitment-weary electorates in 
NATO countries. Once democracy takes root in Russia and other states of the 
former Soviet Union, the AU would include them in its security structures and 
single market. Institutions that promote civic engagement and legislative 
oversight at the transatlantic level should be created to undergird and legitimate 
an Atlantic Union of democratic states.
An AU would sacrifice depth for breadth. But a looser and more 
comprehensive transatlantic union would ensure that the bridge between North 
America and an enlarged Europe rests on solid economic and political trestles, 
not just on increasingly weak strategic ones. It would thus lock in, and 
eventually extend, perhaps the most profound transformation of our century: the 
creation of a community of democratic nation states among which war has 
become unthinkable. The Western democracies have built much more than an 
alliance of convenience among countries that are each out for individual gain. 
They enjoy unprecedented levels of trust and reciprocity and share a political 
order based on capitalist economies and liberal societies.3 The consolidation 
and expansion of this democratic core holds the greatest promise for a stable 
peace in the Atlantic region and beyond, and it is a sensible and prudent starting 





























































































Asia’s economic ascendence and geopolitical instability have raised questions 
about the continuing relevance of a special Atlantic link. Just as Asia-firsters 
attacked America's Atlanticism during the early post-World War II years, they 
are now arguing that preserving the transatlantic community is not worth the 
effort.4 Asia-firsters contend that Atlanticism has served its purpose and that the 
United States has far more pressing needs at home and in the Pacific. Now that 
threats to European peace are limited in geographic scope and severity, Europe 
no longer requires American attention and resources; Europeans can and should 
assume responsibility for their own security. Asia is far more deserving of the 
top spot in America's new geopolitics. It promises to emerge as the next 
century's engine of global economic growth.5 The United States should be 
poised to tap into the region's new markets and capital flows. And unstable 
regional alignments, in combination with uncertainty about how China will 
cope with its new-found power, necessitate the deterrent and stabilising effect 
of a robust American military presence. With Asia's ascendance, the argument 
runs, must come the end of America's Euro-centrism and the beginning of a 
grand strategy anchored in the Pacific rather than the Atlantic.
The Pacific Basin's economic dynamism and political volatility 
notwithstanding, an Asia-first grand strategy is fundamentally flawed. Europe 
still matters for three potent reasons. First, despite the end of the Cold War, the 
US-European partnership continues to serve as the fulcrum for broader 
multilateral action in the international arena. A transatlantic coalition was 
behind all the central diplomatic initiatives of this decade - countering Iraqi 
aggression in the Persian Gulf, bringing to a successful conclusion the Uruguay 
Round of trade negotiations, paving the way for a lasting peace in the Middle 
East, helping to build democracy in the former Soviet bloc, and enforcing the 
Dayton Accord in Bosnia. In addition, the transatlantic partnership is at the 
heart of the institutional infrastructure that underpins ongoing efforts to 
liberalise the international trading system and prevent and stop conflict. To the 
extent that a set of norms and rules are gradually becoming embedded in the 
international system, the driving force emanates from the common values and 
efforts of the Western democracies. For the foreseeable future, no Asian power 
or coalition of powers will be able to fill the shoes of America’s European allies 
in helping to construct an international order based on the principles of liberal 
multilateralism. The United States should by all means sustain a cooperative 
relationship with Japan and seek to channel China’s coming economic and 
military might toward constructive ends. But a strong Atlantic coalition will 




























































































Second, Europe itself would be deeply unsettled should the Atlantic 
connection wither and America disengage from the continent. Whether by 
design or default, NATO has greatly facilitated Europe's coming together by 
assuming responsibility for hard-core security issues, leaving the European 
Community (the EU’s forebearer) free to pursue political and economic 
integration. As Europe’s failure to act decisively and effectively in Bosnia made 
clear, the EU is not ready to take over the management of European security. 
Indeed, an American withdrawal would send shock waves across Europe, 
perhaps threatening even the Franco-German coupling by forcing Germany to 
reconsider its security needs. Should this unravelling of Europe come about, the 
bedrock of US foreign policy - a cohesive Western Europe at peace - would be 
shaken loose.
Third, to allow the transatlantic community to erode would be to miss an 
opportunity to lock in the zone of democratic peace that North America and 
Western Europe have succeeded in constructing. Countries within this zone 
have all but eliminated the security competition and jockeying for relative 
advantage that have characterised international politics for millennia. It may be 
that without a common threat, it will not be long before relations among the 
Western democracies again fall prey to traditional power balancing and the 
search for individual gain. But it is worth trying to do better and to make 
permanent the establishment of a grouping of nations among which war is no 
more.
The Fallacy of the Rest Against the W est
The most effective and familiar means of ensuring the vitality of the West 
would be to find it a new enemy. A transcendent external threat would provide a 
new ‘other’ against which the Atlantic democracies could renew their common 
identity and sense of shared purpose. Whether motivated by concern about 
restoring the West’s cohesion or by a sincere assessment that dire threats are 
looming on the horizon, the search for new fault lines is all the rage. Samuel 
Huntington, for example, sees other civilisations as the new enemy against 
which America and Europe should gird their loins.6 Profound cultural 
differences, Huntington contends, will ultimately lead to a clash of incompatible 
civilisations. While Huntington sees the most serious threat to the West 
emanating from a Confucian-Islamic connection, others worry more about a 
coming divide between Western and Orthodox Christendom.
Robert Kaplan argues that the coming cleavage will fall along socio­




























































































underdeveloped regions promise only to worsen, threatening to engulf the 
industrialised West. In a variation on the same theme, Matthew Connelly and 
Paul Kennedy fear overpopulation and migration from the poorer south to the 
richer north. ‘Demographic-technological fault lines,’ they contend, will define 
the landscape of the twenty-first century.7 The wealthy West must now come 
together to combat poverty and overpopulation lest it be overrun by the world's 
poor.
These efforts to provide the West a new mission and raison d'être are 
dead ends. Ideological and religious affinities do not translate into geopolitical 
alliance any more than ideological and religious differences necessarily trigger 
conflict.8 The Confucian and Islamic worlds - let alone the two together - are 
hardly coherent political actors; both are riven by ethnic, religious, and national 
divides. And Orthodox Europe is not preparing to do battle with Western 
Christendom. Former Soviet republics are still in the midst of efforts to reclaim 
nationhood and rediscover their cultural distinctiveness. But Russia and its 
neighbours are, for the most part, looking westward with hope, not fear. A new 
east-west divide in Europe may ultimately take shape, but it should not do so 
because of a self-fulfilling prophecy set in motion by the West's own actions. 
The challenge for the West is to live comfortably alongside these other 
civilisations, not wilfully or by accident to orchestrate a collision with them.
Overpopulation and poverty are far more worrisome than trumped-up 
cultural clashes. The South's scarce resources will grow ever more strained as 
its population soars. Wealth inequalities between the North and South will 
widen. But the connection between social breakdown in, say, Africa and the 
well-being of the West is at best tenuous. As they have well demonstrated, the 
industrialised democracies are very good at tolerating and cordoning off 
suffering in far-away places. Efforts to instil public alarm by concocting visions 
of millions of diseased and dispossessed storming the beaches of New Jersey - 
or even the Côte d’Azur - are simply too far-fetched. The Western democracies 
should soberly assess how they might help avoid the humanitarian disaster 
looming in Afri, and get on with doing what they can. But a call to arms 
based on the imagery of ‘the rest against the West’ will neither help the rest nor 
galvanise the West.
Too Much Europe
Decision makers on both sides of the Atlantic appear to recognise that the West 
must seek to hang together because of common values and purposes, not 




























































































the EU and NATO to the new democracies of Central Europe are supposed to 
invigorate the West while erasing, not recreating, geopolitical cleavages.
Because they have mapped out futures for the EU and NATO that are far 
too ambitious, however, the leaders of the West are in the process of bringing 
about the demise of these institutions, not their revitalisation. As they should, 
both bodies intend to take advantage of the historic opportunity to open their 
doors to Central Europe. But they have yet to loosen their internal structures, a 
necessary step if their plans for enlargement are to have the intended 
consequences.
The EU continues to move toward a federal Europe - monetary union and 
a common foreign and security policy are the next steps - even as it prepares to 
double its membership. But the ambitious vision laid out in the Maastricht 
Treaty no longer enjoys the popular support that it did five years ago, when the 
treaty passed national referenda by the narrowest of m argins.Indeed, the 
ongoing Intergovernmental Conference in Turin, Italy is primarily an exercise 
in damage control, masking the reality that nation states across Europe are 
reasserting their sovereignty, not giving it up.
Deepening European integration has lost not only its popular appeal, but 
also its strategic purpose. Enlargement is now the geopolitical necessity - and 
not just to the east. The EU's current plans for a Europe-only single market, 
even if it promotes the welfare of its Member States in the short run, will likely 
harm the global economy in the long run. Although the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) Forum also aim to promote regional integration, they differ from the 
EU in one crucial respect: the United States links the two regions through its 
participation in NAFTA and membership in APEC. As trade within North 
America and Asia increases and becomes more liberal, so will trade between the 
two regions. In contrast, if the EU forges ahead on its own to build a single 
market, single currency, and central bank, Europe’s integration into the global 
economy will be jeopardised. Enlargement to the east makes this drift all the 
more likely as the free flow of goods from Central Europe will threaten 
producers in Western Europe, generating new pressures for protection from 
non-EU imports. Because Europe’s welfare state is more extensive and its 
corporate and financial structures less adaptive than their counterparts in North 
America and East Asia, lagging competitiveness will also create incentives for 




























































































The Geopolitical risk of EMU
A single currency is expected to help Europe climb out of its extended period of 
slow growth and become more competitive. And there is little doubt that the 
Euro will bring economic benefits. The economic gains a single currency is 
likely to produce, however, do not alone confirm the desirability of monetary 
union. Precisely because political objectives have been paramount in fuelling 
the push for a single currency, EMU must be evaluated in terms of its political 
as well as its economic merits. After all, elected leaders looking to endow 
Europe with a more pronounced supranational character, not corporate leaders 
looking to increase profits, have been monetary union’s main sponsors.
Within Europe’s dominant narrative, EMU is meant to fulfil two 
geopolitical objectives. First, it is intended to lock in the Franco-German 
coalition by transferring authority over monetary policy from the national to the 
supranational level and by abolishing one of the most powerful symbols of 
sovereignty - national currencies. Second, it is supposed to create an inner core 
of expanding, integrated economies that will act as a magnet, drawing the EU’s 
smaller states toward the centre. A Europe of concentric circles should emerge, 
with successive enlargements of the inner core taking place as states not 
initially included in EMU meet the criteria and are prepared to keep pace with 
France, Germany, and those other EU Member States moving most rapidly 
along the path of deeper integration.
The appeal of this vision notwithstanding, it is by no means clear that a 
single currency will have these intended geopolitical effects. The integrity of 
the Franco-German coalition is, to be sure, essential to preserving an integrated, 
cohesive Europe. Indeed, the Paris-Bonn (soon to be Paris-Berlin) axis is the 
centrepiece of the European construction. It provides the EU an identifiable 
power centre and a hierarchical structure of governance extending outward from 
this centre. At the same time, the coalition also serves as an instrument that 
binds and moderates the influence of Europe’s core. This dual function is what 
allows France and Germany to guide the EU without appearing to dominate it. 
Europe’s smaller states are willing to enter the EU precisely because it provides 
reassurance that the continent’s power centre will exercise its influence in a 
moderate and benign manner.11
The problem is that EMU may well strain, rather than strengthen, the 
Franco-German coalition. Less than 40 per cent of the German electorate 
favours currency union, largely because the deutsche mark remains a powerful 
symbol of national identity. Establishing a supranational monetary authority, by 




























































































reassertion of French and German sovereignty. So too might the economic 
austerity needed to meet the Maastricht criteria jeopardise the Franco-German 
relationship. Workers in France and Germany have resorted to strikes to protest 
the cutbacks in spending implemented by their governments. And the efforts of 
France’s new Socialist government to renegotiate the terms of monetary union 
have already produced strains between Paris and Bonn. As austerity continues 
and squabbling intensifies over preparations for the single currency, the 
temptation will increase for French and German elites to blame each other for 
any setbacks. Monetary union, which is intended to lock in the Franco-German 
coalition, may have precisely the opposite effect.
Even if a common currency succeeds in locking in a prosperous and 
cohesive Franco-German core, the broader construction that results may well 
consist of concentric barriers rather than concentric circles. Monetary union will 
have the greatest payoffs among the advanced economies of northern Europe. 
Similar structures and levels of performance will maximise the benefits 
associated with larger economies of scale and lower transaction costs while 
minimising EMU’s distorting effects on national labour markets. In the 
economies of southern Europe, however, EMU promises to cause considerable 
dislocation and substantial increases in unemployment because of its effect on 
wages.12 EU members initially outside the inner core may therefore choose to 
remain where they are. Those that ultimately choose to join EMU may 
eventually wish they had not.
The symbolic politics of EMU will create its own barriers. In deciding to 
proceed with a single currency, the EU is entering a new phase of its evolution 
in which the de jure equality of its members will give way to their de jure 
differentiation. De jure differentiation, at least on deductive grounds, risks 
turning the centrifugal force that has drawn Europe’s periphery toward its centre 
into centripetal force that will drive centre and periphery apart.
Exclusion from the inner core could raise concern about relative gains, 
concern that has thus far been sublimated by de jure equality. Even if the 
benefits of participation in the EU remain strong in absolute terms, new 
dividing lines might make peripheral states more sensitive to their position 
relative to the core.13 EMU might also lead to relative losses in the periphery as 
the inner circle reaps the benefits of a single currency and leaves behind its less 
fortunate neighbours. Barriers could also result from the explicit relegation of 
some states to a second-class status, producing a sense of injury and rejection in 
affected states and an effort to distance themselves from the source of that 
injury. Finally, EMU could cause fragmentation in the construction of Europe 




























































































circle. Fearful of being left out of monetary union or other aspects of integration 
pursued by the core, neighbouring states may vie with each other to clear the 
hurdles for entry, triggering both old and new rivalries.14 At a minimum, the EU 
needs to think through these issues before it goes ahead with a multi-speed 
construction, only to find that an inner circle, far from serving as the engine 
behind deeper integration, begins to delineate new fault lines across Europe.
Unlike in the past, Europe’s wealthier states will no longer bear the cost 
of ensuring that the EU’s poorer members stay on track. The EU has thus far 
been able to deepen and widen simultaneously in large part because less 
developed countries have been kept happy through side payments. The pie for 
aid is shrinking, however, even as claims on it promise to balloon. Germany, for 
one, is unlikely to continue covering almost one-third of the EU budget. The 
cost of integrating eastern Germany has been enormous. High wages are forcing 
major German firms to move production outside the country. And daunting 
demographic figures loom on the horizon. By 2020, there will be one German 
pensioner for every German worker.15 Come the next century, Germany will not 
be expending resources to ensure that Greece joins a European currency union. 
Despite all the talk of concentric circles and widening cores, monetary union 
between France and Germany may well leave much of Europe's poorer 
periphery just where it is.
CFSP adrift
Political integration has lagged considerably behind progress on the economic 
front, ensuring that the Maastricht agenda will be more a mantra than a map. 
The EU has gone far in nurturing a European identity that sits comfortably 
alongside national identities. But Europeans are not, and may never be, ready to 
move from a fundamentally intergovernmental union to one that smacks of 
federalism. The hallmark of a federal system is the existence of a legitimate, 
representative arena of politics that operates above individual state units. The 
European Parliament, however, is still without real legislative authority and 
remains a forum for speech making, not decision making. The European 
Commission continues to chum out proposals for increased political integration, 
but most have to be approved at the national level. Even as borders become 
more porous, powerful cultural and linguistic dividing lines continue to fortify 
the national state. Opinion polls reveal that publics are at best ambivalent about 
further encroachments on national sovereignty, with support for a single 




























































































The Maastricht Treaty envisioned a common foreign and security policy, 
but the outlook on this front is bleak as well. The Western European Union 
(WEU), the Europe-only defence organisation that has effectively lain dormant 
since its inception in 1948, is to develop the capability to operate independently 
of NATO and intends ultimately to extend collective defence guarantees to 
states that have recently joined the EU or intend to do so in the future. But if 
West European countries could not more fully integrate their foreign policies 
during the Cold War, why should they be able to do so now?
Absent a unifying Soviet threat, the security interests of individual states 
are drifting apart, not coming together. Germany is far more concerned about 
developments in Central Europe than is Spain, Portugal, or France, countries 
that at least for now are preoccupied with North Africa. The failure of the EU 
and NATO to take more effective and timely steps to stop the slaughter in 
Bosnia made clear that Europe's security is now divisible. Which EU members, 
for example, would today defend the Finnish border against a Russian attack, a 
task to which all should be committed in principle since Finland entered the EU 
in 1995?
The EU’s notable lack of progress in forging a common foreign and 
defence policy stems from two main sources. First, the union continues to strive 
for a consensus among all its members, ensuring that it gravitates toward the 
lowest common denominator. Waiting for a union-wide foreign policy to 
emerge is a recipe for paralysis. Not until the EU is ready to act via ad hoc 
coalitions of the willing can it succeed in taking on more defence 
responsibilities. In practice, this approach means relying more heavily on the 
Franco-German coalition to orchestrate collective action, enlisting the 
participation of other EU members on a case-by-case basis.
Second, France and Germany share less common ground on defence 
matters than they do on matters of economic integration. Part of the problem is 
the weight of history and Germany’s continuing reluctance to participate fully 
in multilateral military operations. But French and German leaders also hold 
incompatible conceptions of the ultimate objectives and character of the union. 
For Germany, Europe is a construct for binding, moderating, and managing 
power - in short, for ensuring that the continent never again falls prey to the 
destructive forces of national rivalry. This perspective is not just a reaction 
against World War II. It has deep roots in the Holy Roman Empire, which 
aimed to dampen ambition and diffuse power in Europe. For France, the EU is 
more about amassing and projecting power, aggregating the union’s military 
and economic resources so that it can assert itself as a global actor. The EU is to 




























































































France. This perspective too has deep historical roots that trace back to 
Napoleonic and Jacobin conceptions of France’s destiny as a great power.
Melding these competing visions of Europe will be no easy task. 
Germans will need to become more comfortable with leading a Europe that is 
more engaged and active in global affairs. The French will need to adapt their 
conceptions of what constitutes a more assertive Europe, choosing to apply their 
efforts to facilitate Europe’s equal participation in broad multilateral 
undertakings instead of pursuing an independent course under the illusion that 
doing so constitutes leadership. Unless they arrive at a common conception of 
the broad objectives of integration, Germany and France together will be unable 
to provide the guidance needed to forge a coherent European defence policy.
The Labour Party’s recent victory in Britain raises the novel possibility 
that London might be able to help Paris and Bonn forge a compromise vision. 
Tony Blair shows signs of trying to push Britain toward much deeper 
engagement in the EU. The first trip of Blair’s Foreign Minister, Robin Cook, 
was to Paris and Bonn, not Brussels or Washington. It is at least conceivable 
that Britain will not just cease being Europe’s caboose, but that it will become 
one of the EU’s engines. The British share Germany’s perception of the EU as 
an instrument for binding and managing power, but also share France’s 
appreciation of the importance of projecting influence beyond Europe. Britain 
could also help define a middle road between Germany’s desire to sacrifice 
national sovereignty for a deeper union and France’s Gaullist insistence on 
preserving a strong national state. It would indeed be a strange twist of fate 
should Britain become part of Europe’s core and provide a vision of the EU that 
ultimately carries the day.
Deepening vs Widening
The EU’s plans for simultaneous widening make these numerous obstacles to 
deepening only more formidable. Integrating the economies of the new 
democracies into the EU would bloat the organisation’s budget and pit Central 
and Southern Europe against each other in a competition for regional 
development funds. Because of Central Europe’s sizeable farming sector and 
the Common Agricultural Policy’s price supports and export subsidies, the 
eastward enlargement would burden the EU with enormous outlays. Swelling 
the EU to twice its present membership would, by complicating decision 
making, put an end to Maastricht’s already unrealistic political agenda. A 
common foreign and security policy that would reconcile the interests of some 




























































































By overreaching, the EU opens itself up to two missteps of geopolitical 
consequence. First, in light of the trade-offs between deepening and widening, 
the EU's pursuit of a federal Europe comes at the expense of its eastward 
enlargement. The tighter the internal structures, the higher the hurdles for entry. 
The more energy and resources expended in deepening, the less left over for 
widening. Enlargement will require reform of the EU’s cumbersome decision­
making procedures, expensive agricultural subsidies, and regional development 
program. But to delay the inclusion of the new democracies into Europe’s 
markets and councils while the EU pursues illusory aspirations of federalism is 
to miss a historic opportunity to widen the continent's zone of democracy and 
peace. Though less urgent, the westward enlargement of the single market to 
North America is equally important as a bulwark against Europe's drift from the 
global economy.
Second, the EU's excessive ambition could jeopardise the progress that 
Western Europe has already made in building an integrated union of 
democracies at peace. The vision only dreamed of by the original architects of 
European integration is now a reality. Trying to do more at this juncture risks 
overburdening institutions and triggering a backlash among nation states 
bristling at what electorates will view as unjustified and unwanted 
infringements on national sovereignty. If it continues to cling to a vision its 
Member States will summarily reject, the union will suffer irreparable damage. 
The EU should consolidate its achievements rather than gamble for more and 
risk Europe's undoing in the process.
Too Much NATO
Current plans for the enlargement of NATO are equally problematic. Despite 
the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the establishment of a consultative council 
open to Moscow, NATO is a traditional military alliance whose purpose is to 
concentrate power against an external threat; its enlargement will continue to 
alienate Russia. It will also leave in strategic limbo those states left between 
Russia and NATO’s new eastern border. Expanding NATO in its current guise 
thus promises to resurrect, not eliminate, rivalry between Europe's east and 
west. Enlargement will also erode the alliance from within as current members 
balk at assuming new responsibilities. The days of expansive strategic interests 
are no longer; faced with shrinking threats, status quo powers are becoming less 
willing to take on defence commitments. As for ensuring American engagement 
in Europe, NATO enlargement promises to do just the opposite. If institutions 
evolve as planned, economic and security matters will still be addressed in 




























































































Europe. But defence policy no longer enjoys a position of primacy among either 
electorates or their leaders, making NATO in virtually any form a weak 
foundation for bridging the Atlantic.
NATO must take the lead in consolidating a democratic peace in Central 
Europe and incorporating the region into a meaningful security structure. But 
these tasks need not and should not entail its eastward expansion as a Cold War 
military alliance. It is the formal extension of the mutual defence provisions of 
Article V of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty that would irk Russia and relegate 
those Central European states not admitted to a grey zone of uncertainty. So too 
is it the formality and cost of treaty-based territorial guarantees that make 
NATO enlargement problematic from the perspective of America's domestic 
politics.
The risks of enlarging NATO as a traditional military alliance might be 
justified were a major external threat to Central European states to arise. But 
Russia is neither interested in nor capable of mounting such a threat. Moscow 
does not protest NATO's increasing engagement in Europe's east. Russia has 
joined the Partnership for Peace, watched passively as NATO troops conducted 
exercises with local forces in Poland and the Czech Republic, sent its own 
troops to the United States to train with US forces, and agreed in all but name to 
put under NATO command its soldiers enforcing the Dayton accord in Bosnia. 
What Russia objects to - justifiably - is the formal enlargement of a military 
bloc from which it would be excluded.
Similarly, electorates in NATO countries, if they care at all, are happy to 
see their militaries collaborate with former adversaries. But when it comes time 
for the US Senate to ratify the defence guarantees that come with full NATO 
membership, and the associated costs and responsibilities become apparent, the 
electorate will be neither apathetic nor acquiescent. Party discipline should 
ensure approval of the first wave of new entrants - Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic.17 But it is hard to imagine that voters will continue to respond 
favourably as NATO embarks on second and third waves of expansion, asking 
electorates to extend iron-clad defence guarantees to a host of countries most 
could not locate on a map. Not just prospective entrants would suffer a setback 
were NATO legislatures to reject enlargement. If it stakes its future on moving 






























































































America belongs in Europe, and Central Europe belongs in the West. But if 
Western leaders are to achieve these aims, they must scale back their aspirations 
and focus on consolidating what already exists - a peaceful, integrated 
community of democratic nation states. The challenge is to find a balance 
between an institutional structure that demands too much and falls prey to 
overextension and one that delivers too little and atrophies from irrelevance. In 
addition, strategic matters must no longer be divorced from economic 
considerations. National security concerns will not remain sufficiently salient to 
serve as the West's binding glue. The Western democracies ultimately will hang 
together only if their citizens sense that they occupy a unique political 
community and have vested interests in seeing that community preserved. 
Economic and political arguments will have to carry at least part of the weight 
once borne by strategic concerns.
An Atlantic Union that would incorporate the EU, WEU, and NATO 
fulfils these criteria.18 The initial members of the AU would be the current 
members of these three organisations. The AU would then expand at a steady 
pace not just to Central Europe, but also to Russia and the other states of the 
former Soviet Union. The infrastructure of the EU and NATO would serve as a 
ready foundation for the new body. States joining the AU would take on three 
basic commitments: to introduce a single market, to uphold collective security, 
and to expand political engagement at the transnational level.
Calls for the negotiation of a free trade area encompassing North America 
and Western Europe have already surfaced on both sides of the Atlantic. Part of 
the impetus comes from economic prospects; the removal of today’s barriers 
would, by 2000, increase transatlantic trade by at least 20 per cent.19 The 
introduction of a single market would likely be accompanied by an investment 
protocol and more convergence on regulations and standards, increasing the 
flow of capital and prompting industrial restructuring in Europe and North 
America.20 It would also help prevent both areas from drifting toward 
protectionism and emerging as regional trade blocs. Instead, the United States 
would serve as the pivot of an integrated global economy, connecting a 
transatlantic free trade zone with one encompassing the Pacific Rim.
The most potent appeal of the Atlantic Union’s single market is, however, 
its political significance. The conclusion of the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations reduced trade barriers in most sectors to minimum levels. And the 
EU and the United States agreed at their summit in Madrid in 1995 to pursue a 




























































































threaten powerful sectors such as agriculture and textiles, and thus would call 
for heavy lifting. But just as the introduction of a single market in Europe made 
borders more porous, facilitated political integration, and promoted a sense of 
common identity, so would the creation of a single Atlantic market strengthen 
the underpinnings of the community of North American and European 
democracies. Winning congressional approval of a transatlantic free trade zone 
would not be easy, but a high-profile debate connecting America’s prosperity 
with Europe’s fate would drive home to Americans that they share a unique 
political space with Europeans.
Building an Atlantic community of strong national states that are closely 
integrated economically is a far more realistic enterprise than constructing a 
federal Europe that sublimates the nation state and that omits North America 
from its central project. Returning to some elements of the EU's current agenda 
for deepening may prove expedient down the road. A single Atlantic currency, 
for example, is not unimaginable. But first steps first. Deepening makes sense 
only when it will not come at the expense of the far more vital enterprise of 
consolidating and enlarging a stable, prosperous union of Atlantic democracies.
The Atlantic Union’s commitments to collective security would be looser 
and less automatic than NATO’s current commitments to collective defence, 
removing the key stumbling block to a broader Western security community.21 
The AU would replace NATO’s Article V guarantee and its emphasis on 
territorial defence with a focus on peacekeeping and peace enforcement; 
confronting external threats as well as those that might arise from within, it 
would coordinate multilateral operations across Europe. Members would affirm 
their intention to solve conflicts peacefully whenever possible and, when 
necessary, to use military force to defend against common threats. Case-by-case 
decision making and a broad mandate to preserve peace in the Atlantic area 
would be the organising principles of a new US-European security bargain and 
a revamped NATO. The elimination of NATO’s Article V guarantee would 
weaken the alliance’s deterrent power. But as long as Russia continues to pose 
no threat to Central or Western Europe, compromising deterrence and holding 
out to Russia and its immediate neighbours a realistic prospect of inclusion in 
the West makes good strategic sense.
Scaling back NATO's mission and relaxing the commitments its members 
are expected to uphold is both a logical necessity in the absence of an enemy 
and a manoeuvre that would circumvent many of the problems plaguing current 
plans for NATO's enlargement. Under the guise of the AU, a transformed 
NATO could soon open its doors to the new democracies of Central Europe 




























































































background; joining the AU would be joining a civic community, not a military 
alliance. Collective security commitments would provide the Central Europeans 
some, but not all, of the assurance they seek. American troops would stay in 
Europe. NATO’s existing infrastructure would remain intact. Militaries in the 
new democracies would continue the planning and exercising already begun 
through the Partnership for Peace, furthering their integration into the Western 
security community and their ability to operate with the forces of current NATO 
members. But this steady integration would occur quietly, avoiding the fanfare 
and political histrionics that would make the admission of new members to 
today's NATO so problematic.
To be sure, these new arrangements would involve sleight of hand. 
Central Europe, via AU membership, would secure a place under the West's 
protective umbrella. But couching new commitments in a broader political 
context and making them more contingent on strategic circumstance and less 
formal would render Central Europe's early inclusion in the West far more 
palatable to Russia as well as to electorates in NATO countries. Central 
European states would get to join the club, even if that club proves to be less 
exclusive and selective than the new entrants would like.
Doing away with Article V commitments also permits a broader 
definition of Europe’s boundaries. Because NATO is still a formal military 
alliance, only countries deemed of sufficient strategic value to warrant their 
defence will ultimately be eligible for membership. Some proponents of NATO 
expansion have already begun to argue that enlargement should go no further 
than Poland and the Czech Republic, the two countries that occupy the main 
corridor between Russia and Western Europe. But this plan leaves most of 
Central Europe out in the cold.
In contrast, states would join the AU as they demonstrate a commitment 
to democracy, markets, and international norms of behaviour, offering the 
prospect of inclusion to all of Central Europe as well as the former Soviet 
Union. A pan-European collective security system could become a reality, not 
just rhetoric to placate Russia as Poland enters a NATO everyone knows will 
never go farther east. At the same time, should Russian democracy falter, the 
AU's military infrastructure could serve as the foundation for a new, enlarged 
anti-Russian alliance.
Finally, merging NATO with the EU and WEU avoids a looming crisis 
over the responsibilities of these institutions. The three already have 
incongruent memberships that will grow only more inconsistent should they 




























































































likely scenario, the EU and the WEU incorporate ten or more Central European 
countries while NATO stops after accepting only three or four, the United 
States and its main European partners would no longer share parallel strategic 
commitments on the continent. The AU, on the other hand, would keep 
American and European commitments in step, preserving the sense of common 
purpose that undergirds the Atlantic community.
Regardless of how far east the AU ultimately reaches, its major powers 
should form a directorate to prevent the sequential entry of new members from 
making the body unwieldy. A small, flexible forum in which the major powers 
could forge a consensus, this directorate would guide the AU on both military 
and economic matters. The absence of a formal mechanism for great power 
leadership has prevented the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe from fulfilling its potential. Moreover, an informal concert of major 
states already calls the shots on the continent. The Contact Group formed to 
seek a settlement in Bosnia consisted of the United States, Germany, France, 
Britain, and Russia. In practice, both NATO and the EU function through the 
fashioning of agreement among their leading members. A major power 
directorate at the core of the AU would only formalise present realities, while 
making possible effective decision making and timely collective action.
Galvanising domestic polities
The final pillar of an Atlantic Union is deepened civic engagement on the 
transnational level.2'  Civic society among nation states emerges from political 
participation and community association, just as it does within nation states. If 
the Atlantic community is to survive and prosper, its citizens must share a sense 
of belonging not only to their nation states, but also to a transnational political 
space that the Western democracies inhabit. The legitimacy that the institutions 
of the EU enjoy in its Member States, for instance, is not just a function of the 
services they provide. It is also a reflection of the degree to which Europe has 
come to compete with the nation state as a defining element of individual 
identity and allegiance.
The Cold War bequeathed to the West a rich network of public 
institutions and associations as well as private enterprises and groups that 
transcend national boundaries. Thickening this network so that it becomes the 
enduring social and political fabric of an Atlantic Union entails several tasks. 
The European Parliament should be enlarged into an Atlantic Parliament and 
charged with providing legislative oversight of the AU. National parliaments 




























































































substantive portfolio of responsibilities to an Atlantic Parliament would nurture 
a Western political identity that complements national loyalties, thereby 
legitimating a transatlantic polity. The Atlantic Parliament’s duties would 
include designing the AU's budget, aligning American and European social 
policies, and developing union-wide laws and regulations.
Public and private groups should ensure the flowering of the many forms 
of transatlantic association - business contacts, religious and cultural activities, 
social causes, and leisure activities. These associations will intensify citizens’ 
engagement in and identification with a transatlantic polity. Educational and 
vocational exchanges and scientific and industrial collaboration should also be 
promoted. Finally, Western governments should launch ambitious education 
campaigns to inform their electorates of the importance of public engagement in 
preserving and widening the transatlantic community. The West is unravelling 
in part because it lacks the defining images and projects that galvanise domestic 
polities. Constructing an Atlantic Union of democracies will not call up the 
same sense of collective commitment and sacrifice as the struggle against 
communism. Yet it need not. Bold leadership in laying out a vision of a 
peaceful, prosperous union of Atlantic democracies and proceeding with the 
necessary institutional innovations will suffice to wean citizens away from 
domestic preoccupations and inspire them to construct a new West.
Europe, America, and the Global Order
Constructing an Atlantic Union is not just a prudent move aimed at making 
permanent the historic transformation of the Atlantic area from a zone of war 
into a zone of peace. It would also lay the groundwork for a more integrated and 
cooperative global order. To make the renovation of the West a top priority of 
US foreign policy is not to demote other regions or indicate that the Western 
democracies must prepare to do battle against them. On the contrary, locking in 
peaceful relations among the Atlantic democracies will free the Western powers 
to address challenges elsewhere. A strong Atlantic coalition will also increase 
the West’s leverage in other regions. As they work to build an Atlantic Union, 
the United States and EU members should explicitly seek to augment 
cooperation with powers outside the Atlantic area and help promote stability in 
those areas. Although its results were less substantive than symbolic, the EU- 
Asia summit in Bangkok in 1996 was an important step in the right direction.
While strengthening its ties to other regions, the AU should also foster 
regional integration elsewhere. Linked by global trade and coordination among 




























































































eventually consolidate new zones of peace and provide the foundation for a 
more stable international order. The main reason for not inviting Japan, one of 
Asia’s most democratic and prosperous nations, to join the AU is that a focus on 
the Atlantic community would distract Japan from facilitating further 
integration in its own neighbourhood. The AU is thus the first step toward the 
creation of a global concert of democratic great powers that would coordinate 
relations among and within regional organisations.
The AU would also serve as the driving force behind the liberalisation of 
global trade. Through successive accessions to NAFTA, a transatlantic free 
trade zone would gradually extend throughout Central and South America. 
Because the EU is already looking south as well as east, an Atlantic single 
market might eventually include the Middle East and North Africa. Fearful of 
being excluded from the AU's widening trade zone, other areas would face 
pressure to open their own markets in return for access. The geoeconomic move 
toward globalisation would balance the geopolitical move toward 
régionalisation.
Constructing an Atlantic Union is a conservative enterprise. Plans that 
call for further sacrifices and increased responsibilities, like monetary union and 
NATO expansion, have little public appeal in this era of waning 
internationalism. A more modest set of objectives is needed to fashion a new 
consensus. Rather than deepen institutions, the AU would merely extend their 
reach, reasonably asking electorates on both sides of the Atlantic to form a 
single market, uphold collective security, and send representatives to a common 
parliament. By solidifying a transatlantic community at peace, an Atlantic 
Union would do much more for the West and the rest of the world than 
monetary union among Germany, France, and Luxembourg or tank traps on the 
Poland-Belarus border. If the AU successfully consolidates democratic peace, 






























































































1 The Intergovernmental Conference in Turin has made clear that Europe is falling far short of 
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